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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
E\""" A EISNER, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
SALT LAKE CITY, a Municipal 
Corporation, 
Defendant, Third-Party 





Case No. 7675 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT LEO BONNERU 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Third-party defendant accepts the Statement of 
Facts as set forth in the brief of defendant, Salt Lake 
City, with the following exceptions and additions: 
Third-party defendant, Leo Bonneru, took out a 
permit to install a sewer line at about 125 West 3rd 
South, Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. 18). It was stipulated 
that the work that was done at that location was pur-
suant to that permit. Further, the work that was done 
· pursuant to that permit was completed on October 9, 
1948. (R. 75, 76, 18, 19). 
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It was stipulated at the pre-trial that defendant 
Salt Lake City on October 21, 1948, excavated a hole for 
the purpose of installing a water valve and meter and 
ins1talled a water valve and meter on 3rd South Street 
near 125 West 3rd South in an area 6' x 8' and that said 
area included the location of the sewer excavation made. 
by third-party defendant Leo Bonneru. (R. 18, 19). 
There was some confusion as to the exact location of the 
hole into which plaintiff claims she fell. However, her 
testimony at the trial placed the location of the hole one 
foot east of the water meter locruted at that point. (R. 58, 
61-67 inclusive). 
At the close· of the plaintiff's testimony, third-party 
defendant made the motion that the court dismiss the 
action as to said third-party defendant with prejudice 
on the ground that no competent evidence had been of-
fered and received upon which the jury and the court 
could return. a verdict against third-party defendant. 
(R. 78). 
Also, third-party defendant made the motion that 
the court direct a verdict of no cause of action in favor 
of the third-party defendant and agains1t the plaintiff, 
Eva Eisner, and defendant, Salt Lake City, for the 
reason that no competent evidence had been offered and 
received from which the court or jury could return a 
verdict against said third-party defendant, and, further, 
upon the ground that the testimony of plaintiff shows 
conclusively that plaintiff was guilty of contributory 
negligence as a mat1ter of law. (R. 78, 79). 
The motion of third-party defendant Leo Bonneru 
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. 
was granted by the trial court on the 8th day of March, 
1951. (R. 20, 79, 80). 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I. 
PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY NO NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
LEO BONNERU. 
POINT III. 
ASSUMING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT LEO BON-
NERD WAS NEGLIGENT IN SOME MANNER, HIS NEGLI-
GENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
While it may be apparent that the trial court's 
ground for directing a verdict in favor of defendant and 
third-party defendant was on the grounds of contribu-
tory negligence, it is a matter of general law that the 
court on appeal will uphold the verdict of the trial court 
if it is sustainable on any ground. See Corpus Juris 
Secundum, Par. 1464, Page 72, Vo~ume 5: 
"While the appellate court cannot consider 
on review questions or grounds of recovery which 
are not within the pleadings, evidence, findings, 
or issues which were tried and passed on, it may 
affirm the judgment where it is correct on any 
legal ground or theory disclosed by the record, 
regardless of the ground, reason, or theory adop-
t.ed by the trial court." 
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PLAINTIFF IS GUILTY OF CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW. 
Defendant, Salt Lake City, has covered the field 
quite extensively in respect to the ground of contributory 
negligence. For this reason third-party defendant will 
not burden the court with additional citations dealing 
specifically with facts similar to the case in question. 
F·rom the facts as presented in the Statement of 
Facts of both plaintiff and defendant, it is apparent that 
reasonable minds could not differ as to what an ordinary 
prudent person would have done under the circumstances 
confronting plaintiff. She was aware of the existence 
of the hole in the sidewalk as she had passed by the lo-
cation numerous times. Upon approaching the hole in 
the sidewalk, she did not look or ascertain where she 
was stepping and, consequently, ·as a result of her aimless 
n1anner in walking upon the sidewalk she. was injured. 
It is apparent that she could not have been distracted 
to any extent by the approach of the group of children 
coming in the opposite direction as none of them had 
reached her or had touched her and, by her own testi-
mony, she was not even conscious of the children until 
they were three or four feet to the west of her. The 
only conclusion that can be drawn, based upon plaintiff's 
own statements, is that she was walking or proce·eding 
in a thoughtless and purposeless manner and giving little 
heed, if any, :to the surrounding conditions. This court 
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has, in passing on the grounds of contributory negligence, 
held that in such cases the plaintiff's negligence is a 
question for the court to determine, and is negligence 
as a matter of law. 
In the case of OSWALD \T. UTAH LIGHT AND 
RAIL,,~_A_Y CO., 39 Utah 245, 250, 252, 117 P. 46, 48, the 
court states : 
'"When, however, the conduct is such-accept-
ing the general test for want of a better one-that 
reasonable minds may not differ as to what a pru-
dent person ordinarily would have done under 
the circumstances, and whether the conduct of the 
person charged, with negligence came up to that 
standard, like one heedlessly walking or driving 
in front of a moving car, the court may itself 
pronounce the conduct negligence." · 
"Plaintiff's not seeing the flat cars, and not 
knowing whether the black object seen by her was 
a street car or something else, or whether it was 
standing or moving, did not result from such a 
mistake or misconception, but from her conduct 
in looking in an objectless .and aimless manner, 
from her negligent or careless behavior in that 
regard. Because of that thoughtless and purpose-
less manner of looking and of her careless con-
duct in that regard, the flat cars were not seen 
by her, though they were plainly visible and al-
most in her direct path as she undertook to cross 
the track." 
In the case of TAYLOR V. BAMBERGER ELEC-
TRIC RAILWAY CO., 62 Utah 552, 564,220 P. 695, 700, 
the COUI'It said : 
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"This court has so often held that it has be-
come elementary that the question of both negli-
gence and contributory negligence are questions 
of fact for the jury. It is, therefore, needless to 
cite the numerous cases where it is so held. It 
has, however, also very often been held by this 
court that where there is no conflict in the evi-
dence, and no conflicting inferences are permis-
sible, the question of contributory negligence is 
one of law and must be determined by the court. 
That is especially the case where, as here, the 
whole question turns upon plaintiff's own state-
ments respecting his conduct in the premises, 
which conduct constitutes negligence." 
Also see Restatement of the Law of T.orts (Ameri-
can Law Institute) Sec. 463-Contributory negligence 
defined: 
"Contributory negligence is conduct on the 
part of the plaintiff, which falls below the stand-
ard to which he should conform for his own pro-
tection and which is a legally contributing cause, 
co-operating with the negligence of the defendant 
in bringing about the plaintiff's harm." 
POINT II. 
THE EVIDENCE SHOWS CONCLUSIVELY NO NEGLI-
GENCE ON THE PART OF THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT 
LEO BONNERU. 
Plaintiff states at page 4 of her brief: a There is no 
dispute concerning the negligence, of both defendants. 
Apparently it is conceded that to allow the hole into 
which plaintiff stepped to remain along the north edge 
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of the cement slab for ouer a year, woHld be negligence 
on the part of both defenda1rts.-'' r:rhis state1nent is en-
tirely unfounded and absolutely inconsistent with the 
evidence submitted and the motions n1ade by third-party 
defendant Leo Bonneru and granted by the trial court. 
Aceording to the stipulations agreed to by all parties 
concerned, the work which was done pursuant to the 
permit issued by Salt Lake City to Leo Bonneru, was 
completed on October 9, 1948. Thereafter, on October 
21, 1948, the defendant Salt Lake City excavated in the 
same area, which included the location of the sewer 
excavation made by third-party defendant Leo Bonneru. 
There is nothing in the record to show the condition of 
the sidewalk at the time third-party defendant completed 
whatever work he did; nor is there anything in the record 
which would indicate that the sidewalk was not in a 
normal condition similar to that of the surrounding side-
walk; nor is there anything in.the record to indicate that 
at the time the defendant Salt Lake City excavated this 
location, that the sidewalk prior thereto was not in as 
perfect and normal condition as the surrounding area. 
There has been an utter failure in this regard to show 
any evidence that third-party defendant Leo Bonneru 
was negligent in any way. It is, therefore, the duty of 
this court to sustain the judgment of the lower court. 
POINT III. 
ASSUMING THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANT LEO BON-
NERD WAS NEGLIGENT IN SOME MANNER, HIS NEGLI-
GENCE COULD NOT HAVE BEEN THE PROXIMATE 
CAUSE OF PLAINTIFF'S INJURIES. 
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The defendant Salt Lake City on October 21, 1948, 
after third-party defendant's work had been completed, 
excavated in the same area which included the location 
of the sewer excavation made by third-party defendant. 
Assuming that the third-party defendant was in some 
n1an!J.er negligent by some prior work which he may have 
done, the action of the defendant Salt Lake City in ex-
cavating in the same location was an independent, super-
vening cause, which was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries. Any action on the part of the third-
party defendant at this location in setting up a negligent 
condition would be done away with, altered or changed 
to such an extent that third-party defendant's assumed 
negligence in this regard could not be considered the 
proximate cause or legal cause of the plaintiff's injuries 
any more than it can be assumed that the contractor who 
originally laid the sidewalk at that point may have left 
defective cement work, such as protruding abutments, 
cornices, etc. As has been stated in Point II, there is 
nothing in the record to indicate the condition of the 
sidewalk at the time any work done by third-party de-
fendant was con1pleted, or the condition of the sidewalk 
at the ti1ne defendant Salt Lake City began exca:vations. 
The only reasonable result which can be arrived at is 
that the assumed negligence of third-party defendant 
was not the natural or probable cause of plaintiff's in-
juries. This court has passed on this question in a num-
ber of cases. In the case of HANSEN V. CLYDE, 89 
Utah 31, 37, 44, 46, 47, 56 P. 2d 1366, 104 A.L.R. 943, the 
court states : 
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.. If it be assu1ned that negligene~ 'vas alleg·ed 
in tern1s against the defendants, then liability 
would attach for all the injurious consequences 
that reasonably and naturally follow fron1 the 
negligence until :such negligence is diverted by 
the intervention of son1e efficient cause that 
1nakes the new or intervening cause responsible or 
that sets in n1otion the negligent force that be-
con1es the proximate cause of the injury." 
Justice Wolfe in his dissenting opinion in the Han-
sen case, sets up various catagories to be used in the 
determination of the question of proximate cause. He 
states: 
• H First. Single dynan1ic negligence. rrhe 
simple case where one sets in motion a train of 
direct· links of cause and effect until the event 
or accident is reached. The simplest of these is 
where the cause which produces the event is iru-
Inediate with no links between, as where one 
drives his car against another with no inter-
mediate links-trespass vi et armis. But, regard-
less of how mediate or i1nmedia:te the initial 
cause may be, if there is a straight succession of 
cause and effect leading to the event, it is clearly 
a case of proximate cause. Thus where a car runs 
against a pole, knocks it down in such a way as 
to knock a part from a house which falls and in-
jures a pedestrian. This was still trespass, be-
cause the chain was continuous and always in 
action. And, if the agencies which transmitted the 
initial cause to the final outcome acted spontane-
ously or automatically, it was still considered as 
a succession of inanimate agencies, one acting on 
the other. (Squib Case [Scott v. Shepherd], 2 
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W. Bl. 892, 3 Wils. 403), and the form of action 
was trespass." 
"Seventh. * * * Wherever the action of the 
human agent is based on a decision which was 
not the quick reaction from, or if it was only re-
motely or questionably influenced by, the condi-
tion met, such action will be considered as start-
ing an independent or supervening or intervening 
chain of causation so as to make the "condition 
set" not a contributing cause. Thus in the case 
of Smith v. Locke Coal Co., 265 Mass. 524, 164 
N.E. 381, 61 AI_jR 1052, where a coal chute ex-
tending fro1n the wagon across the sidewalk in-
fluenced a pedestrian to divert his course around 
the wagon into the street where he slipped on ice. 
The negligence of the coal company in viola:ting 
the city ordinance was not a contributing cause; 
the new course of the pedestrian starting a new 
and distinct chain of causation." 
In FARRELL V. CAMERON, 98 Utah 68, 84, 94 P. 
2d 1068, 1075, the court states : 
"Proximate cause is that cause which in nat-
ural or continued sequence, unbroken by any new, 
intervening, efficient cause, produced the result 
complained of, and without which the damage 
would not have been sustained." 
In the case of KA W AGICHI V. BENNETT, 189 P. 
2d 109, 111, the following was said: 
"There can be no doubt that Instruction No. 
7, as given by the court, correctly states the law 
as to what is a 'proximate cause.' Rollow v. 
Ogden City, 66 U 475, 243· P. 791. We do not 
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understand appellant to say that this instruction 
is erroneous as a general proposition, but that 
under the facts of this case it \vas prejudicial to 
give such an instruction since the accident in-
volved children and as a Inatter of law, if the 
respondent was negligent, his negligence was the 
proxi1nate cause of the injury and there co1.tld be 
no question of an intervening cause unless sttch 
cause was not reasonably foreseeable. We are not 
prepared to say that if respondent was negligent 
that under the facts of this case his negligence 
as a matter of law was the proximate cause of the 
injury and was not a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury. The appellant cites the case 
of Cahill v. E. B. & A. L. Stone Co. et al., 167 Cal. 
126, 138 P. 712, as authority for this proposition. 
This case is based on the 'turntable' or 'attrac-
tive nuisance' doctrine, wherein the courts have 
held that where an instrumentality which .may he 
dangerous and attractive to children is left "\vhere 
such children are likely to use it, and injury re-
sults therefrom, that the negligence of the owner 
of the instrumentality is the proximate cause of 
any such injury despite the fact that such injury 
would not have resulted but for the action of chil-
dren setting the instrumentality in action, as 
such action by children could be reasonably fore.;. 
seen. In the instant case, the 'attractive nuis-
ance' doctrine cannot possibly have any applica-
tion." 
It is unreasonable to conclude that third-party de-
fendant Leo Bonneru must foresee and be expected to 
guard against a subsequent negligent act of defendant 
Salt Lake City any more than the original contractor 
who laid the entire sidewalk would be expected to fore-
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see and guard against the negligent excavations of de ... 
fendant Salt Lake City. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion it is asserted that plaintiff's careless 
and aimless manner in proceeding along the sidewalk 
constitutes negligence as a matter of law and precludes 
plaintiff's recovery. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
in the record to show wherein third-party defendant 
was negligent. Even assuming third-party defendant 
was negligent in some manner, such negligence could 
under no circumstances be considered the proximate 
cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
Judgment for third-party defendant should be af-
firmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
McCULLOUGH, BOYCE & 
McCULLOUGH 
Attorneys for Respondent 
417 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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·-------------·---------copies of the within brief received this 
----------------· day of ----------------------------------------------------, 1951. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and· Appellant, 
Eva Eisner 
Attorneys for Defenda;nt, Third-
Party Plaintiff and Respondent, 
Salt Lake City. 
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